Disparaging Language in Brief Prompts Professionalism Ruling

In the movie comedy Monty Python and the Holy Grail, there is a scene where King Arthur and his men, standing at the base of an imposing castle wall, demand entry to the castle, which they believe contains the grail. They are opposed, not with force, but with insults hurled down by a lunatic guard perched high above them.

“You don’t frighten us, English pig-dogs!” the guard shouts. “Go and boil your bottom, sons of a silly person. I blow my nose at you, so-called Arthur King, you and all your silly English knights. Your mother was a hamster and your father smelt of elderberries.”

King Arthur asks the guard to be reasonable, but the taunts continue. And they work. King Arthur eventually retreats without the grail, not wanting to endure further verbal abuse.

Nearly all litigators know that name-calling and taunting an opponent are not effective strategies, even in the most competitive environments.

Nearly all litigators know that name-calling and taunting an opponent are not effective strategies, even in the most competitive environments. Yet the practice persists in briefs and motions and, to a lesser extent, in courtroom argument. Lawyers are communicators by profession. They have a way with words. Sometimes their rhetoric goes too far.

In Cordero v. Olson Assocs. P.C., No. 2:23-cv-00756 (D. Utah, May 13, 2025), the magistrate judge, after disposing of several pretrial discovery disputes, turned her attention to one attorney’s habit of larding his legal arguments with verbal abuse of opposing counsel in briefs and motions.

The magistrate picked the following from his court filings to date. According to that attorney, his opponent’s legal arguments were:

• “disingenuous”
• “nonsense”
• “meaningless”
• “callous”
• “intellectually dishonest”
• “extraordinary and baseless,
• “blatantly untrue”
• “fundamental mischaracterization of the law”
• “legally meritless”
• “empty of any true substance”

The disparaging characterizations continued. Discovery motions filed by opposing counsel were asserted to be:

• “blatant judicial waste”
• “bad-faith attempt to burden Plaintiff with frivolous litigation tactics”
• “attempt to micromanage Plaintiff’s counsel’s work processes”
• having “no rational basis whatsoever”
• “unwarranted meddling with Plaintiff’s counsel’s ability to effectively represent his client”

The attorney also accused opposing counsel of engaging in “especially egregious coercion” and having “no modicum of respect for a woman’s private medical history.” He contended that opposing counsel “need[s] to be reigned [sic] in” and insisted the court “admonish [him] for his conduct.”

The magistrate judge ruled that this language towards opposing counsel was unacceptable. “It is hostile, discourteous, and uncivil,” she wrote. In fact, it violated the Utah Standards of Professionalism and Civility. Those standards, the magistrate wrote, demand that attorneys treat “other counsel, parties, judges, witnesses, and other participants in all proceedings in a courteous and dignified manner,” and forbid “hostile, demeaning, or humiliating words in written and oral communications.” Also improper is attributing “improper motives, purpose, or conduct” to other counsel without factual basis.

The magistrate ordered that the offending attorney read the Utah professionalism standards and submit a certification that he has done so, along with a promise that he will, in the future, abide by those standards “in both letter and spirit.”

Sometimes, a dry remark that opposing counsel’s arguments are “unsupported by the law of the record” is the most withering accusation that can be leveled at an opponent. And the least likely to attract judicial condemnation.